グライス「協調の原則」の誤解
B.L. Davies, Grice's Cooperative Principle: Meaning and rationality, J. Pragmatics, 39 (2007), pp.2308-2333.
1. Introduction
2. Grice's Cooperative Principle
3. Grice's Cooperative Principle and 'cooperation'
4. Setting the scene: a background to Grice's work
5. The Gricean program
6. Conclusion
以下，自分用のメモです．
■グライスの「協調の原則」は誤解されている：「協調 cooperation/cooperative」は日常的な意味で理解されてはならない．
グライスの基本的な論点は，「言うこと (saying)」と「意味すること (meaning)」との区別にある．
話し手が言ったことに符号化されている言語的な意味（それがなんであれ）から，意図されている意味を引き出すために仮定されたのが協調の原則．
話し手が implicit なことばを使っているときにその意図することを聞き手が認識するというタスクが問題となっている．
これは，聞き手側への負担を増やすことになる．
（直接的に言えることを，間接的に言うのだから）
したがって，話し手は発話を情報提供的にすべく協調しているわけではない（日常的な「協調」の意味で）．
会話の格率は【規則 (rule)】ではなくて【原則】：
・規則は遵守されるか違反されるかのどちらか；
・原則はその間に広大なグレーゾーンがある．
"In general, the field of pragmatics has adopted that aspect of Grice's work which it sees as most appropriate to its own concerns. This in itself is not surprising, but I would suggest that reading Grice (1975, 1978) in isolation is not sufficient to see beyond the text to Grice's motivations. (p.2315)
※「推意 (implicature)」の概念は「知覚の因果説」(Grice 1961) で感覚与件を論じる際に初めて提示された．(p. 2317)
非自然的意味，意味NN (meaning^NN)
Grice (1968)：
"U meant (nonnaturally) something by uttering x", [which can be formulated as] "For some audience A, U intended his utterance of x to produce in A some effect (response) E, by means of A's recognition of that intention." (Grice (1968: 58, emphasis added))
話者意図 (speaker intention) が意味認識 (meaning recognition) において果たす役割をグライスは強調する．
2段階を提案：
(1) Speaker-meaningNN is explained in terms of utterer's intentions.
話者意味NNが話者意図により説明される．(2) Sentence-meaningNN is explained in terms of speaker-meaning.
文意味NNが話者意味により説明される．
The first stage is the process that was outlined in example (4) above. The second stage uses (the now explained) concept of speaker-meaninig to attain the goal of sentence-meaning. So the proposed analysis not only manages to account for the truth conditional theorists' gold standard of sentence-meaning in terms of utterer's intention, but it also does so in a non-circular fashion. (p.2319)
The first stage:
(1) "Speaker A meantNN something by sentence x (on a particular occasion)."
例："Bill is a good cook."
話者意味には3つの必要十分条件がある：
1. Speaker's intention that his utterance should induce the belief that 'Bill is a good cook' in his Audience
自分の発話によって聞き手のうちに「ビルは料理が上手だ」という信念を引き起こそうという話し手の意図2. Speaker intends that the Audience should recognise the intention behind his utterance
聞き手が発話の背後にこの意図を認識するようにという話し手が意図する3. Audience's recognition of Speaker's intention plays a part in explaining why the Audience should form this belief
聞き手による話者意図の認識は なぜ聞き手がこの信念を形成するかの説明に一役買う．(p. 2319)
The second stage：
(2) "Sentence x meansNN (timeless) something (that so-and-so)."
例：
(6) The sentence "Bill is a good cook" meansNN (timeless) that Bill is a good cook.
The speaker-meaning which has been identified via speaker-intention can only be said to be that sentence's sentence-meaning if token of the sentence "Bill is a good cook" are conventionally associated with the speaker-meaning which has been identified. In other words, the utterance:
(7) Blue is a fat cat
only meansNN (timeless)
(8) There is an X, such that X is a cat, such that X is known as Blue, such that X is fat
if there is a conventional relationship between utterances of the form (7) and sentence-meanings such as (8).(p.2320)
この理論に対する反論：
・Ziff (1967), Searle (1965) ：グライスは発語内効果と発語媒介効果のちがいを捉えていない．
・Platt (1979) ：構成的な意味のあつかいに循環がある〔文意味の説明 (8) の中で (8) それじたいを説明に使っている〕
「日常言語学派」対「理想言語派（ラッセル，フレーゲ）」の対立において，グライスは次のような立場を取る：
Moreover, while it is no doubt true that the formal devices are especially amenable to systematic treatment by the logician,
it remains the case that there are very many inferences and arguments, expressed in natural language and not in these devices, that are nevertheless recognizably valid.
... I have, moreover, no intention of entering the fray on behalf of either contestant.
I wish, however, to maintain that the common assumption of the contestants that the divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that the mistake arises from an inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation.Grice (1975: 43)
Therefore, the aim of Grice (1975) is to demonstrate the existence of a logic to the operation of conversations.
したがって，グライス (1975) の目標は，会話の機能になんらかの論理 (a logic) が存在していることを証明することにある．
§5.3 Conventional and conversational
協調の原則の議論は，慣習的-規約的推意 (conventional implicatures) からあっというまに非慣習的-規約的推意，すなわち会話の推意へと移ってしまう．
これもまた，推意の概念から格率の探求へと性急に移ってしまうことの一例．
The distinction between conventional and non-conventional has its basis in the speaker-meaning and sentence-meaning program outlined above.
慣習的-規約的ｖｓ会話的の区別は，話者意味と文意味のプログラムに立脚している．
Under the Grice program, stres and irony must have a conventional meaning before they are allowed to trigger implicatures. The gact that Grice is investiing so much tangible effort in the maintenance of this distinction demonstrates his view of its importance to the overall program.
(p. 2322)
§5.4 The Gricean motivation
問題×3
[1] Firstly, what does Grice see as the underlying motivation?
[2] Secondly, what evidence is there to support this?
[3] Finally, what implications does this have for the Gricean analysis of conversation?
5.4.1 Rationality in Grice (1975)
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are, characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts.
Grice (1975: 45, original emphasis)
協調の原則と無関係の場所で「協調」のタームが使われることは滅多にない；それに対して，「合理性」のタームはいたるところで使われている．
Therefore, Grice is attempting to analyse implicatures in such a way as to highlight their rational aspect. From such a standpoint, one could characterise implicature in the following way:
Hearers assume that an utterance addressed to them is intended to be meaningful, therefore if the utterance doesn't have an appropriate conventional meaning, they will look for a more useful (and non-conventional) interpretation. As far as Hearer is concerned, the Speaker providing an uninterpretable (meaningless) utterance would be pointless, and therefore irrational.
Adapted from Davies (1998: 52)
5.4.2 Rationality in the thought of Grice
グライスの思想にとって，合理性は中核をなすものだった：
It might be held that the ultimate subject of all philosophy is ourselves, or at least our rational nature, and that the various subdivisions of philosophy are concerned with different aspects of this rational nature. But the characterization of this rational nature is not divisible into water-tight compartments; each aspect is intelligible only in relation to the the others.
Grice (1986: 65)
5.4.3 Defining rationality
Grandy & Warner (1986: 20)：
On Grice's view, a person has 'evaluative principles' that cannot change. Not because they are programmed in; rather, they are principles a person cannot abandon if he is to count as rational.
協調の原則は，この "evaluative principles" のひとつだと Davies は主張する．
Value is connected then to the rather loose ideas of 'what it is proper to do' and 'what it is optimal to do'.
... what a word means in a language is to say what it is in general optimal for speakers of that language to do with that word; what particular intentions on particular occasions it is proper for them to have, or optimal for them to have.
Grice (1982: 239)
