[paper] Egan (2007) "Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion"(イーガン「認識的法助動詞・相対主義・確言」)

Egan, Andy (2007). "Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion." Phosophical Studies 133: 1-22.

同じ認識的法助動詞文であっても,評価主体 (evaluator) によって真理値が異なるのが,著者の擁護する相対主義

ABSTRACT. I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantis for epistemic modal claims such as "the treasure might be under the palm tree", according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It't easy to be puzzleed about just what purpose would be served by assertions of this kind, and how to understand what we'd be up to in our /use/ of sentences like "the treasure might be under the palm tree", if they have such peculiar truth conditions. After providing a very quick argument to motivate a relativist view of epistemic modals, I bring out and attempt to resolve this problem in making sense of the role of assertions with relativist truth conditions. Solving this problem should be helpful in two ways: first, it eliminates an apparantly forceful objection to relativism, and second, spelling out the relativist account of assertion and communication will help to make clear just what the relativist position is, exactly, and why it's interesting.

  • Introduction
  • Motivation for relativism: eavesdroppers
  • Self-locating content and relativism
  • Self-locating assertion
  • A problem: disastrous assertions
  • The problem, formally
  • The response, informally
  • The response, formally
  • Relativism about epistemic modals and the assertibility test
  • Conclusion


 さまざまな悪巧みの長所・短所を議論している途中で,ナンバー2がブロフェルドに言う:「ボンドはチューリッヒにいるかもしれない」(Bond might be in Zurich.)
 スペクターの秘密基地で,ブロフェルドがナンバー2に言う:「そのとおり」(That's true).このブロフェルドの発話は明らかに適切.また,これ以外に次のように言っても適切になる:

  • "You're right."
  • "You have jsut expressed a truth."
  • "ZURICH is true."
  • "What you have just said is true."


[book] Lycan (2001) Real Conditionals(ライカン『実在的条件文』)

Lycan, William G. (2001). Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

1. The Syntax of Conditional Sentences
2. Truth Conditions: The Event Theory
3. Truth Conditions: Reality and Modus Ponens
4. In Defense of Truth Value
5. A Beautiful But False Theory of 'Even if'
6. An Unbeautiful But Less Easily Refutable Theory of 'Even If'
7. The 'Indicative'/'Subjunctive' Distinction
8. The Riverboat Puzzle

  • Appendix: 'Nonconditional Conditionals' (with Michael Geis)
  • Revisionary Postscript on Non-Conditional Conditionals


[book] Vance (2008) The Sounds of Japanese(日本語の音声)

Vance, Timothy J. 2008. The Sounds of Japanese. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


 その点で,この Vance の本はとりあげるべき話題をよく考えてあり,しかも記述内容が信頼できる点がえらい.

1. Phonetics

  • 1.1 Speech sounds
  • 1.2 Airstream mechanisms
  • 1.3 Phonation
  • 1.4 Nasality
  • 1.5 Transcription and segments
  • 1.6 Length
  • 1.7 Suprasegmentals
  • 1.8 Vowels
  • 1.9 Obstruents
  • 1.10 Sonorants
  • 1.11 Secondary and double articulation
  • 1.12 Acoustic displays

2 Phonemics

  • 2.1 Phonology
  • 2.2 Contrast and minimal pairs
  • 2.3 Allophones and phonemic symbols
  • 2.4 Allophones in complementary distribution
  • 2.5 Allophones in free variation
  • 2.6 Distinctive features
  • 2.7 Redundant features and allophonic rules
  • 2.8 Phonotactics
  • 2.9 Affricates
  • 2.10 Diphthongs
  • 2.11 Overlapping and neutralization
  • 2.12 Careful pronunciation

3 Vowels

  • 3.1 Short vowels
  • 3.2 Long vowels
  • 3.3 Vowel sequences
  • 3.4 Vowel reduction

4 Syllabic-initial consonants

  • 4.1 Stops
  • 4.2 Fricatives
  • 4.3 Affricates
  • 4.4 Nasals
  • 4.5 Liquid
  • 4.6 Semivowels

5 Syllable-final consonants

  • 5.1 Syllable-final nasals-
  • 5.2 The mora nasal phoneme
  • 5.3 Phonotactics of the mora nasal
  • 5.4 Syllable-final obstruents
  • 5.5 The mora obstruent phoneme
  • 5.6 Phonotactics of the mora obstruent

6 Syllable and moras

  • 6.1 Syllables
  • 6.2 Moras
  • 6.3 Mora timing
  • 6.4 Syllables, moras, and accent
  • 6.5 Words and music
  • 6.6 Extra-long syllables
  • 6.7 Vowel-vowel sequences

7 Accent and intonation

  • 7.1 Intonation
  • 7.2 Pitch accent
  • 7.3 Noun and particle accent
  • 7.4 Verb accent
  • 7.5 Adjective accent
  • 7.6 Longer phrases
  • 7.7 Compounds
  • 7.8 Sentence-final intonation

8 Other topics

  • 8.1 Vowel devoicing
  • 8.2 Syllabic-initial velar nasals
  • 8.3 Glottal stops
  • 8.4 Alveopalatal obstruents and romanization

[paper] König and Siemund, 2000. "Causal and concessive clauses: Formal and semantic relations."


König, Ekkehard, and Peter Siemund, 2000. "Causal and concessive clauses: Formal and semantic relations." In Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth, and Kortmann, Bernd (eds.) Cause-Condition-Concession-Contrast: Cognitive and Discourse Perspectives. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000, pp. 341-360. 



It is an intuition of long-standing that concessive constructions are somehow the negative or contradictory counterpart of causal constructions. This intuition is expressed by terms like "incausal", "anticause" or "inoperant cause" that are frequently used istread of "concessive". It is shown that this intuition, which is supported by a wide variety of facts across languages, can be explicated by analysing the meaning of causal and concessive constructions in such a way that the external negation of the former is equivalent to the internal negation of the latter. A semantic analysis for concessive constructions is proposed which meets this criterion of adequacy. Furthermore, it is shown that this opposition between concession and causality can also be observed in "interactive patterns of conceding". What is negated in such interactrive schemas of concession is the assumption of an interlocutor that some fact is a reason for a specific conclusion. 


  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Causal and concessive connectives: phenomena in need of explanation 
  • 3. Some recent proposals
  • 4. Towards an explication 
  • 5. Discourse approaches to the analysis of concessive relations 
  • 6. Conclusion 


TRANSCRIPT: Don Norman, "Conceptual model"


It's very important to provide the user with a good conceptual model. This makes it easier for the user to understand what's going on and to invent new actions from the older ones that work. But if you're not careful, if you give the wrong conceptual model, well, they'll invent wrong actions. 

Here's an example. On the desktop model, we show each directory by an icon, an icon of a file folder. The icons are within the window. A number of years ago, when the Macintosh computer was first introduced, and all we had were floppy disks, my son was using the Macintosh. Its directory folder looked something like this. When he tried to save a file, he was told at one point "I'm sorry, there's not enough room to save your file." So, my son, being very intelligent, believed in the conceptual model that had been presented to him, went back, looked at the directory folder, and carefully moved all the file folders over to the left, making considerable room on the right. Then he went back to the same application and tried to save. "Can't do it," he was told. "No room." Why not? Look at the screen. There is plenty of room. Problem is, that's a wrong conceptual model. Room in the picture on the screen is not the same as room on the floppy disk.


なんとなくトランスクリプトをアップしてみたり.動画は The Voyager Company が 1994年につくった CD-ROM に収録されていたものだそうで.(ソース:”Videos from Design of Everyday Things")


追記:twitter にて,koda_TO さんと t_hayashi さんにいっぱい添削していただきました.感謝.