[paper] Egan (2007) "Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion"(イーガン「認識的法助動詞・相対主義・確言」)

Egan, Andy (2007). "Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion." Phosophical Studies 133: 1-22.

同じ認識的法助動詞文であっても,評価主体 (evaluator) によって真理値が異なるのが,著者の擁護する相対主義

ABSTRACT. I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantis for epistemic modal claims such as "the treasure might be under the palm tree", according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It't easy to be puzzleed about just what purpose would be served by assertions of this kind, and how to understand what we'd be up to in our /use/ of sentences like "the treasure might be under the palm tree", if they have such peculiar truth conditions. After providing a very quick argument to motivate a relativist view of epistemic modals, I bring out and attempt to resolve this problem in making sense of the role of assertions with relativist truth conditions. Solving this problem should be helpful in two ways: first, it eliminates an apparantly forceful objection to relativism, and second, spelling out the relativist account of assertion and communication will help to make clear just what the relativist position is, exactly, and why it's interesting.

  • Introduction
  • Motivation for relativism: eavesdroppers
  • Self-locating content and relativism
  • Self-locating assertion
  • A problem: disastrous assertions
  • The problem, formally
  • The response, informally
  • The response, formally
  • Relativism about epistemic modals and the assertibility test
  • Conclusion


 さまざまな悪巧みの長所・短所を議論している途中で,ナンバー2がブロフェルドに言う:「ボンドはチューリッヒにいるかもしれない」(Bond might be in Zurich.)
 スペクターの秘密基地で,ブロフェルドがナンバー2に言う:「そのとおり」(That's true).このブロフェルドの発話は明らかに適切.また,これ以外に次のように言っても適切になる:

  • "You're right."
  • "You have jsut expressed a truth."
  • "ZURICH is true."
  • "What you have just said is true."